Abstract-Control of access to information based upon advantage of the tenmporal access control nmechanism. Our temporal attributes can add another dimension to access initial inmplemrentation requires the admiinistrator to set control. To demonstrate the feasibility of operating system-. . t level support for temporal access controls, the Time Interval temporal aIttrbutes on executables, viz, the login shell File Protection System (TIFPS), a prototype of the Time In-and objects prior to user access to the system. Implementaterval Access Control (TIAC) model, has been implemented tion of temporal access control mechanisms in the operating by modifying Linux extended attributes to include temporal system offers several advantages: a consistent and coherent metadata associated both with files and users. The Linux systemtoffesever tags ap consi an coherent Security Module was used to provide hooks for temporal ac-abstraction presented to all applications; an encapsulated cess control logic. In addition, a set of utilities was modified mechanismi; arid protection of the meclianislnl fromi arbito be TIFPS-aware. These tools permit users to view and trary modificatioii by applications. The TIFPS prototype manage the temporal attributes associated with their files and directories. Functional, performance, and concurrency adds another layer of protection against unauthorized actesting were conducted. The ability of TIFPS to grant or cess to files and directories, arid serves as a starting point revoke access in the future, as well to limit access to specific for experimentation in temporal access control systems. II. BACKGROUND
I. INTRODUCTION
This section briefly reviews related work in temporal access controls contrastiig it with the TIAC model. PossiIn many situations, access to information should not be ble implementations of TIAC are discussed and features of perpetual. For example, limited tempora,l availability could Linux relevant to a, TIAC implementation are presented.
be applied to items ranging from student exams to medical prescriptions. Exams should be ava,ilable to students dur-A Time Interval Access Control (TIAC Model ing a pre-determined exam period, whereas prescriptions Authorization models using temiiporal constraints or temnmight only be valid for a few weeks or months after they poral attributes have been proposed previously. Bertino et have been written. Current access control systems do not al. described a, model [41, [5] that associated temporal conprovide a conceptually siniple and complete niechanism for straints with access authorizations and models tempora,l niodulating access of subjects to files based upon temporal dependencies among authorizations. The notion of assoattributes: a start time when access is allowed and a stop ciating temporal constraints with authorizations wa,s extime when access is revoked.
tended in an access control model that supported disconiAfinidad formally modeled temporal access control in the tinuous teniporal constraints oni authorizations [6] . RoleTime Interval Access Control (TIAC) model [1] , [2] . lo un-Based Access Control (RBAC) has also beeni extended to derstand the practical design implications of such a system, support teniporal constraints to the activationi and deactia prototype iniplemenitation of the TIAC model has been vation of roles [7] . Alturi and Gal [8] , [9] proposed a niodel developed for the Linux operating systein. The Time Inter-somewhat more closely related to TIAC: access control conival File Protection Systeni (TIFPS) consists of a mrodified straints are based on temporal attributes associated with Linux Security MViodule that iniplemenits the TIAC access the data as well the tinie of the data access request. control logic [3] . Extended attributes are used to associate None of the authorization models mentioned above suptemporal metadata with files and directories. To demon-port policies based on temporal attributes associated with strate the usability of TIFPS at the application level, a both subjects (e.g., a process representing the user) and number of file management utilities were modified to take objects (e.g., data). Seminal work [10] , [11] , [12] has modeled authorizations for subjects' to access to objects using Irvine, Nguiyen, Chiang The TIAC formal semanitics is unamiibiguous and provides Files and directories lacking temporal attributes are treated the ability to precisely decide when a, subject with a given as if temporal access is permitted at all times. A simple set of temporal attributes has permission to access an ob-commanid-line utility facilitates administrative control over ject, which is also endowed with temporal attributes. Sinice temporal attributes associated with files and directories. the model requires only three time intervals: those associ-The utility also permits normal users to view temporal atated with subject and object, and the time interval during tributes, while additional options allow administrators to which access is requested, TIAC-based access policies can modify those attributes. lo provide user-level TIFPS supbe checked for consistency using decidable algorithms [1] . port, additional command-line utilities have been adapted 'lo demonstrate the feasibility of constructing a fine-to be TIFPS-aware. grained temporal access control system based on the TIAC model, a prototype was designed that utilized a combina- . For all objects with temporal access a,ttributes, the kerIn the TIFPS prototype, attributes a,re set by the a,d-nel will mnediate temporal access to those objects ba,sed on The value of the extended attribute has the format ":OxOOOOOOOO:Ox7FFFFFFF\0", where the first hexadecil'o prevent unauthorized extension of access to informa-mal number represents Fstart and the second hexadecim,-al tion by copying, when read access to an object is requested number represents Fend. Storing temporal attributes in in TIFPS, the process's teinporal attributes are updated this formrat simplifies string parsing during access control to take on the intersection of the temporal attributes of operations.
the object being read and the process's current temporal "Ext3", a popular journaling file system that is installed attributes. This is illustrated in Figure 2 . After a, program by default and supports extended attributes [17] [3] . Since default security hooks have no effect, it was sufficient to implement only the security hook func-tenm. After reading the file, then, due to the inheritance tions necessary to achieve the desired system behavior. of temporal attributes, the process's tinme-of-allowed access
In the Linux kerrnel, task_struct contains inetadata on also expires in 5 minutes. So, after 5 minutes, the task will processes and inodes contain metadata on files, directories, not be allowed to access any other files. and other file systein objects. The Linux Security ModOne modification of the policy that was considered but ule predefines in each of these data structures a security not implemented is described here. Since the intent is object pointer to a security structure that is custom de-to preserve the temporal attributes on information, the fined for the specific LSMI implementation. In the TIFPS tifpstaskLsecurity-struct could be implemented to "keep LSM implementation, the security structure defined for track of" (as opposed to inherit) the inost restrictive temprocesses is named tifpstaskLsecurity_struct and has the poral attributes based on the intersection of previously acfollowing fields: a 4-byte back pointer to the tasklstruct, cessed objects' attributes. Only during an atteinpt to write a semaphore data structure used for synchronization, and would the systein enforce access control and transfer the two signed inLtegers representing ) start and 'end for al-teinporal attribute with the most restrictive time interval lowed access by the process. The inode security structure to the objects being written. This work-around was not imis named tifps-inode-security-struct and has the following plemented because the file read operation implies a write fields: 4-byte back pointer to the inode struct, a semaphore operation to the kernel stack, and thus the same problem data structure, and two sig(ned integers representing Fstapt would persist. and Fe,nd for allowed access to the object represented by
For the purpose of the current prototype, the fork-andthe miiode structure [31_ the copy-process() kernel function. Sinice the attributes gramiis for setting and getting extended attributes: setcopied to the child are those that the parent had when fattro) and getfattro), respectively. Setfattr can only be the parent was created, this meant that the forked "child" run by the administrator account, whereas getfattr can be inherited the temporal attributes of its "grandparent". lo run by any user. The modtime command was designed as ensure that "child" processes inherited the temiiporal at-a wrapper program that encompassed these. The modtime tributes of their "parents" at the time of child process cre-tool presents standard Linux comiimand line tool syntax and ation, the parent attributes are used to determiiine the child semantics. A man page describing its usage was written process's temporal attributes. [3] .
'lo prevent increasingly restrictive access as directo-
The following existing command-line functions were ries dynamically inherit temporal attributes, the current modified to be TIFPS aware: mkdir, rmdir, touch, chmod, . Inheritance of temporal attributes in file and directory creation operations and in file-copy operations, rfo provide an interface to the temporal attributes asso-. Possible corrupted file format information due to incomcia,ted with files and directories, a, new tool modtime, wa,s plete writes resulting from access revocation. (Note that developed to meet the following objectives: directory writes are not a problem, as these are atomic with . Relative tinme will be with respect to current time, Tc,Lrr. respect to the access checks.) (Note that internally the systemn enforces its temporal polThe static tests for explicit file and directory creation icy based uponi absolute timre, e.g., on Novenmber 5, 2007 resulted in expected temporal attribute inheritance behavat 1700 hours revoke access to parliament.txt) ior.
. Temporal attributes will be set by specifying them in A set of copy tests was devised to ensure that information either absolute time or relative tinme. copied from one object to another would have the most T Ihe administrative interface will be easy to use; it will restrictive combination of attributes of the pair. Figure 4 not require complicated time calculations by the adminis-illustrates three scenarios and the expected inherited tirme trator.
interval for the created file is shown. For each of the three * The tool will be able to take multiple arguments to scenarios, three ways to copy files in Linux were tested: the change or display the temporal attributes of multiple files cp comnmand, redirection, and pipes. The tests using pipes and directories at once. ha,d unexpected results and will be discussed in IV-A.1.
Usage instructions will be mnade readily available.
'Iests were created to examine the behavior of the system * The tool will display useful error mnessages to interactive when access to a file is revoked during a write operation. The results showed that file corruption could occur if access * The tool will allow the temporal attributes of files and is revoked while an application is writing state informiation directolries to be easily viewed, to a file. Fedora Core 5 a,s well as other Linux operating systemus DynLamic attribute mnodificationl tests were designed to runLninlg Linux 2.6 a,nd up include a, set of user-space pro-observe the beha,vior of the systemn when temupora,l a,t- TABLE I  TIFPS PERFORMANCE TEST SUMMARY (UNITS ARE IN SECONDS) the reading, writing, and copying of files on an unmodified 3. When copying files to their home directories, each of the 2.6.15 kernel and the sa,me kernel loaded with the TIFPS subjects' copies of the file inherited the temporal attributes LSM. The two kernels were guest operating systems on associated with the individua,l user. a machine running virtualized VM'ware server inmages of 4. When subjects attempt to concurrently copy private Fedora, Core 5. The hardware running the ViMIware ima,ge files into a shared directory, it was found that each user's has an Intel Pentium 4 processor running at 3.00 GHz. The respective temporal attributes were preserved as expected. RAlVI allocated for the ima,ge is 256M.
The shared directory reta,ined its original temporal atTwo additional factors were considered: the intrinsic tributes as expected. overhead associated with TIFPS-enabled entities; and performance variations between repeated actions on the same V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK file and similar actions on different files. It was hypothe-
The benefit of TIFFS include kernel-level protection of sized that differences in data structure allocation and ni-the mechanism as well as consistent policy enforcement tializa,tion might affect performance. across all applications. TIFPS enforces proper inheritance The results in Table I suggest that, contrary to hypoth-of temporal attributes by subjects and objects for copy opesis, the presence of TIFPS attributes did not significantly erations. This feature results in a tension between correct affect the performance. The reason for this result could be security behavior and the availability of system services.
that inost of the perforinanice overhead of TIFPS occurs lo enforce proper inheritance in a temporal access conin the setup of the function calls to the TIFPS security trol system, a policy similar to the High Watermark [12] 
